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When I began studying computer security in late 1972 as a Ph.D. student at 
Purdue University, the field was in its infancy.  There were few academics working in the 
area, no research conferences or journals devoted to the field, and no professional 
societies to join.  Security papers were presented at conferences and published in journals 
that covered more established areas of computer science, such as operating systems, or 
that treated computing and telecommunications broadly.  The number of publications and 
Ph.D. theses relating to computer security was small enough that it was possible to read 
the entire literature.  If there was any security industry at all, I was not aware of it. 
The computing environment at Purdue consisted primarily of two mainframes: 
one used by the faculty and students for academic work, and the other by the 
administration.  Neither was connected to the emerging Internet.  The systems were 
accessed via punched cards and “dumb terminals” (machines with monitors and 
keyboards but no computing capability or memory).  Security consisted mainly of two 
mechanisms.  First, access to the machines was controlled through accounts and 
passwords.  Second, the administrative system was physically separated from and 
unconnected to the academic system so as to protect the more sensitive data handled by 
the former.  We did not use firewalls, anti-viral tools, vulnerability scanners, or intrusion-
detection systems; such tools had not even been invented. 
The field has changed dramatically in the 30 years that have passed.  Now there is 
a multi-billion-dollar-a-year security industry offering thousands of products and services 
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to everyone from large corporate enterprises to home computer users.  There are more 
security conferences than I can keep track of, let alone attend, and enough publications to 
fill a library.  Thirty-six universities have been declared Centers of Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance Education, and numerous companies offer training in computer 
and network security and forensics. There are professional societies devoted to security, 
and certification programs for security technologies, operating environments, and 
security professionals.  Information security has become a topic of conversation at board 
meetings and social gatherings.  It is a priority in business and government.  It has led to 
new laws and regulations, and to new policies and procedures for handling information.  
It is on the agenda of Congress, the President, and international bodies. 
In recent years, governments have become particularly concerned with protecting 
critical infrastructures from physical and cyber attacks.  In 1996, the Clinton 
Administration formed the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(PCCIP).  The PCCIP was tasked to study the critical infrastructures that constitute the 
life support systems of the nation, determine their vulnerabilities to a wide range of 
threats, and propose a strategy for protecting them in the future.  Eight infrastructures 
were identified: telecommunications, banking and finance, electrical power, oil and gas 
distribution and storage, water supply, transportation, emergency services, and 
government services.  Their recommendations led to several initiatives discussed later in 
this chapter. 
 
While much of the focus at the national policy level has been on protecting 
critical infrastructures, cyber security is vital to much more.  Information technology is 
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woven into practically all business processes and control systems.  Cyber attacks have 
real-world consequences that impact the economy and our daily lives.  
To address today’s threats to information-based systems, security has evolved 
from the simple access controls of 30 years ago to a complete infrastructure in its own 
right.  This infrastructure serves to protect computers and networks, and the information 
that is generated, acquired, processed, transmitted, and stored by them.  Like many of the 
systems it protects, the security infrastructure is global and interconnected.  It is growing 
and evolving, and will continue to do so as long as information technology itself evolves. 
The objective of this chapter is to explore this emergent infrastructure and the 
factors that are shaping its development.  The focus is on cyber security, which includes 
computer security and network security, but excludes those aspects of information 
security that deal with information that is not computerized (e.g., print media). 
 The factors shaping the development of the security infrastructure are divided into 
five areas: threats, technology developments, economic factors, psychological factors, 
and social and political factors.  These areas will be discussed after first describing the 
elements of security infrastructure.   
Limitations of space preclude giving more than a broad overview of the topics.  
Many issues are ignored or brushed over lightly.   Further, more attention is paid to 
developments in the United States than elsewhere.  The aim is a conceptual framework 
for understanding the state of security today rather than complete coverage of all the 
pieces of the framework.  
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THE CYBER SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
The cyber security infrastructure consists of those elements involved in the protection of 
networked computers and information from cyber threats. The objective is to deter, 
prevent, detect, recover from, and respond to threats in cyberspace.  The threats take a 
variety of forms and include unauthorized access to or use of information resources, and 
computer network attacks that deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy information and network 
resources.  They include theft of information, computer viruses and worms, defacement 
of web sites, denial-of-service attacks, computer and network penetrations, and sabotage 
or fabrication of data.  The security infrastructure serves to protect against these threats 
and ensure the confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and availability of data. 
The security infrastructure includes information technology, procedures and 
practices, laws and regulations, and people and organizations.  These areas are inter-
related and impact each other.  Developments in technology, for example, can lead to 
new procedures and practices, new laws or regulations, and the formation of new security 
companies.  Each is discussed briefly below. 
 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Information technology consists of the hardware and software used to generate, acquire, 
process, distribute, and store information.  Of interest here are technologies that serve to 
protect cyberspace from attack through prevention, detection, investigation, and recovery.  
Prevention technologies include authentication systems (e.g., passwords, biometrics, and 
smart cards), encryption systems (for scrambling data and network communications), 
access controls, firewalls, vulnerability scanners, and security management systems.  
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Detection and investigation technologies include auditing and intrusion/misuse detection 
systems, anti-viral tools, honey pots for trapping and studying intruders, trace back 
mechanisms for determining the origin of an attack, and computer and network forensic 
tools for handling and processing evidence.  Technologies for recovery include backup 
systems.  
None of the technologies offers a “silver bullet” for security.  They all have their 
limits.  Encryption, for example, can protect e-mail from snoops, but not from viruses or 
spam attacks.  Security is possible only through a combination of controls coupled with 
good management and operating practices, supporting laws, and effective law 
enforcement – in short, the security infrastructure.  Even then, security is never foolproof. 
Further, some security technologies are also employed as attack technologies.  
Password crackers and software tools that scan networks for vulnerabilities are good 
examples.  While system owners use them to find and fix their own problems, their 
adversaries use them to find security holes, which are then exploited in an attack. 
Technology standards play an important role in security.  They establish baseline 
requirements for security and promote interoperability between devices that need to 
communicate.  A good example is the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol.  SSL is 
implemented in web browsers and servers, and used to encrypt confidential data such as 
credit card numbers that are transmitted between a user’s browser and a web site. 
Standards have a downside as well.  The TCP/IP protocols, which are the 
foundation of the Internet, facilitate massive attacks against large numbers of computers.  
That so many of the computers are running the same software (e.g., versions of Microsoft 
Windows, Linux, and Unix) further aggravates the problems. 
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PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES 
These relate to the management of security and information technology.  They include 
“best practices” for developing, installing, and operating computers and networks so as to 
minimize security vulnerabilities and risks.  Best practices have been developed in areas 
such as selecting and managing passwords, deploying firewalls, configuring and 
upgrading systems, and planning for and responding to security incidents.1
Good management practices are at least as crucial to security as deploying 
security technology.  Most outsider attacks, perhaps all but one or two percent, exploit 
known vulnerabilities that could have been avoided by system administrators and users.  
Humans are often the weak link.  They make mistakes, pick weak passwords, and are 
vulnerable to social engineering (being conned by attackers into providing passwords or 
access to systems, for example).  They develop software with security flaws and open 
virus-laden e-mail attachments from strangers. 
 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
In the United States and elsewhere, it is illegal to access a computer or information stored 
on a computer or transmitted over a network without authorization and with intent to 
defraud, trespass, or cause damage to data or systems.  It is also illegal to traffic in 
passwords or similar access codes.  Such activity is covered at the federal level by the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 and subsequent amendments, and by various 
other federal and state laws.   However, not all countries criminalize these activities, and 
those that do may not have consistent laws.  
A second set of laws and regulations regulate the investigation of cyber attacks 
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and threats by law enforcement and intelligence officers.  These include laws for 
acquiring data about a subject of investigation from third parties, intercepting a subject’s 
communications, and searching and seizing a subject’s computing devices.  
A third class of laws and regulations mandate security for certain systems.  In the 
United States, the Office of Management and Budget requires federal agencies to conduct 
security certifications of systems that process sensitive information or perform critical 
support systems.  Such requirements do not, however, apply to the private sector, which 
is generally unregulated with respect to security.  One exception is the Health 
Information Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA), which specifies security and 
privacy requirements for systems that handle patient records.  However, many private 
sector organizations impose internal security policies on their IT operations. 
A fourth set of laws and regulations restrict trade in information security 
technologies.  For example, certain encryption technologies are subject to export controls 
although these controls have been substantially lifted in recent years. 
 
PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS 
The security infrastructure includes individuals and organizations with an interest in 
security.  Both formal and informal organizations participate, including government 
agencies, corporations, educational institutions, professional societies, non-profit 
organizations, research communities, standards committees, international bodies, and 
consortia.  Some groups come together temporarily for a specific purpose, for example, to 
participate in a security-related seminar, workshop, or meeting.  Groups can operate 
domestically or internationally, and meet physically, virtually, or both.  Many use the 
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Internet, especially e-mail and the web, to facilitate their activities, collaborate with 
others, and reach a broader audience. 
The people and organizations participating in the security infrastructure perform a 
variety of different functions.  These include education and training, research, 
publication, product development and marketing, network security administration, 
security support services, policy and standards making, law enforcement, and research 
funding. 
None of these parties “owns” the security infrastructure.  However, individuals 
and organizations are responsible for the security of their own systems.  Governments are 
not responsible for the security of systems in the private sector, but they can influence the 
security of those systems through laws and regulations (e.g., HIPAA), public-private 
partnerships, research programs and grants, and other efforts. 
Participants in the security infrastructure constitute a loosely structured network.  
Organizationally, this network resembles an all-channel or full matrix network2 where 
everyone is connected to everyone else through the Internet (and other communications 
media).  There is no central command or headquarters for the network as a whole and 
decision-making takes place across the network.  When a major security incident 
affecting multiple organizations occurs, as with a major virus outbreak, many participants 
in the security network respond simultaneously to the attack, issuing alerts, releasing 
software tools and upgrades, reconfiguring systems, and hunting down the attacker.  Even 
though organizations are responsible only for protecting their own systems, they can 
draw upon the network for products, services, standards, training, and other types of 
assistance. We now turn to the factors shaping the security infrastructure. 
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 CYBER THREATS 
A major force behind the security infrastructure is the real and perceived threat of cyber 
attacks.  After briefly reviewing the characteristics of the threat, we will summarize some 
of the incident data showing the prevalence of the threat. 
 
THREAT CHARACTERISTICS 
Cyber threats are characterized by an attacker, a target system, a set of actions against the 
target, and the consequences resulting from the attack, including damages to the target, 
direct and indirect losses to victims, and impact to third parties.  A prolonged denial-of-
service attack against an Internet Service Provider (ISP), for example, can result in lost 
revenue, incident handling costs, and even bankruptcy for the ISP.  Customers of the ISP 
will also suffer; to the extent they depend on the Internet for their business or home 
activities. 
Threats are often classified by the nature and mission of the attacker.  There are 
six major categories: hackers, insiders, corporate spies, criminals, terrorists, and nation 
states.  Although the term “hacker” can denote any computer buff, in the context of cyber 
threats, it usually means a person who gains access to or breaks into computers and 
networks in a way that was not intended and is generally not authorized.  For example, 
the objective may be to deface a web site, steal passwords to facilitate further attacks, or 
launch a computer virus or denial-of-service attack.  Not all hacking is illegal, as when 
users hack their own systems or companies use employees or security consultants to test 
the security of their systems, so the threat pertains only to those who hack without 
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authorization.  Many hackers are teenagers who pursue hacking more as a game or hobby 
than an attempt to wreak damage.  Nevertheless, their actions do harm their victims. 
Insiders consist of employees, former employees, temporaries, contractors, and 
others with inside access to an organization’s information systems.  They are behind 
many of the most serious attacks, including theft of trade secrets, financial fraud, and 
sabotage of data.  Insiders are generally considered to be an organization’s biggest threat, 
accounting for perhaps 80% of all security incidents (not all cyber related) in some firms.  
However, only 35% of cases involving theft of intellectual property were attributed to 
insiders, according to a survey conducted by the New York-based security firm Michael 
G. Kessler & Associates.3
Corporate spies include both foreign and domestic companies.  They steal trade 
secrets primarily for competitive advantage.  The Kessler study attributed 18% of the 
thefts to other U.S. companies and another 11% to foreign companies. 
The category of criminals generally refers to persons who attack systems for 
money.  They steal credit card numbers, identities, and intellectual property. They siphon 
money from bank accounts and extort their victims by threatening to expose stolen 
secrets or cause serious cyber damage.  They operate alone, in concert with insiders, and 
through organized crime rings. 
So far, terrorists are using the Internet primarily to support their physical 
operations rather than to launch cyber attacks.  There have been a few incidents of 
hackers affiliated with or at least sympathetic to terrorist causes engaging in typical 
hacker-type activity such as web defacements and denial-of-service attacks. 4  For 
example, after the September 11 attacks, one group of Muslim hackers defaced U.S. 
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government web sites with messages proclaiming they stood by bin Laden and 
announcing an “Al-Qaeda Alliance Online.”5
There is a growing concern that terrorists might launch cyber attacks against 
critical infrastructures.  According to reports, Al Qaeda operatives visited websites that 
offered software and programming instructions for the digital switches that run power, 
water, transport, and communications grids.  Interrogations of Al Qaeda prisoners 
revealed general intentions to use those tools.  In February 2002, the CIA issued a revised 
Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum, indicating that Al Qaeda had far more interest 
in cyber terrorism than previously thought.6
Nation states are often considered the most serious threat, if not the most likely.  
They have the most resources, and may decide to employ cyber weapons to augment or 
replace physical ones.  According to some analysts, as many as 20 countries have cyber-
warfare capabilities, including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iraq.  China in particular 
is said to have an aggressive information warfare program, motivated in part by the 
recognition that it could not defeat the United States with conventional warfare.7  
 
SECURITY INCIDENTS 
Computer network attacks have been rising steadily, in some cases dramatically, in recent 
years.  Figure 1 shows that the number of incidents reported to the Computer Emergency 
Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) has more than doubled each year since 
1998, reaching 52,658 in 2001.8  Considering that many, perhaps most, incidents are 
never reported to CERT/CC or indeed to any third party, the numbers become even more 
significant.  Further, each incident that is reported corresponds to an attack that can 
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involve thousands of victims. The Code Red worm, which infected about a million 
servers in July and August, was a single incident.  Web defacements have also more than 
doubled annually in the past few years, according to the London-based firm mi2g, 
reaching 30,388 in 2001.9
  The prevalence of computer viruses and worms has been increasing at a similar 
rate.  Message Labs, which scans its clients’ e-mail for viruses, reported that 1 in 1,400 
messages had a virus in 1999.  The infection rate doubled to 1 in 700 in 2000 and then 
more than doubled to 1 in 300 in 2001. 10  ICSA.net (now TrueSecure) also has reported 
an increase in infection rate, from about 1% of computers in 1996 to 11% in 2001.11
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which until a few years ago were relatively 
unheard of, are now commonplace.  A study conducted at the Cooperative Association 
for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) at the University of San Diego Supercomputer 
Center observed about 12,000 attacks against 5,000 different targets during a three-week 
period in February 2001.12
Riptech, which offers security management and monitoring services, reported a 
28% rise in attack activity in the first 6 months of 2002 as compared with the last 6 
months of 2001.  On average, their clients each experienced an increase from 25 attacks 
per week to 32 attacks per week.  From this data, they projected an annual growth rate of 
64% in attack activity.13  The majority of attacks came from the United States and its 
allies.  Less than 1% of the attacks came from countries on the U.S. cyber terrorism 
watch list.  There were no attacks from Iraq, Libya, N. Korea, or Syria. 
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 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 
Developments in technology shape the security infrastructure both directly and indirectly.  
The direct impact comes from technologies that enable new or improved security tools 
and services.  The indirect impact results from technologies that aggravate the threat, 
thereby leading to actions that enhance security.  This section briefly reviews three trend 
areas: ubiquity, power, and vulnerability. 
 
UBIQUITY 
Information technology is becoming increasingly pervasive and connected.  It is 
spreading throughout our offices, homes, automobiles, and elsewhere.  It is being 
integrated into everything from appliances and vehicles to business processes and control 
systems.  It resides in both fixed and mobile devices.  Software moves through the 
networks, carrying computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and other forms of malicious 
code. 
This trend toward ubiquitous computing affects information security in two ways.  
First, there are more targets to attack and more people attacking them.  Second, attacks 
can have real-world consequences.  The Code Red worm, for example, led to the delay of 
55 Japan Airlines flights after shutting down a computer used for ticketing and check-
in.14  Another incident that took place in early 2000 led to loss of wildlife and 
environmental damage.  In that case, a 49-year-old Brisbane man allegedly penetrated the 
Maroochy Shire Council’s waste management system and used radio transmissions to 
alter pump station operations.  A million litres of raw sewage spilled into public parks 
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and creeks on Queensland’s Sunshine Coast, killing marine life, turning the water black, 
and creating an unbearable stench.  Evidently, the man was angry about being rejected for 
a council job.  He had formerly worked for the company that had installed the system, 
which gave him inside knowledge and the software needed to conduct the attack. 15  
Approximately 3,000 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems control critical infrastructures such as the power grid, dams, and pipelines.16  
Many of these systems have very poor security.  In the past, this did not matter much, 
because the systems were arcane and isolated.  Increasingly, however, they are controlled 
through networks based on the Internet protocols, potentially making them more open to 
attack. 
The proliferation of mobile computing devices has extended an organization’s 
network security perimeter from the workplace to homes, airports, automobiles, and hotel 
rooms.  Information once confined to office networks can make its way to home PCs, 
laptop computers, and hand held devices, which may be less protected physically as well 
as virtually.  Each year, tens of thousands of laptops are reported lost or stolen, many 
with extremely sensitive information, including government classified information. 
Organizations are installing wireless networks with little regard for security.  
Using a technique called “war driving,” hackers drive around cities looking for 
unprotected networks.  When one is found, they can access the network to read corporate 
communications or simply use the network as they would their own.  A seven-month 
audit sponsored by the International Chamber of Commerce found that 92% of the 5,000 
wireless networks in London were vulnerable to casual attacks.17  Network operators had 
either not turned on the security features or else used them with default settings that were 
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not secure. 
The spread of information technology has also had some positive impact on 
security, for example, by enabling the development of remote security services.  There 
are now services that check a computer or network for vulnerabilities, scan incoming or 
outgoing e-mail for viruses, monitor client networks for attacks, provide encryption 
services, manage public-key certificates, and detect and locate stolen laptops. You can 
download security products and information from the web, and you can find out about 
new problems by subscribing to one of several security alert services. 
 
POWER 
Information technology is getting smaller, faster, cheaper, and more powerful.  Processor 
speeds are doubling approximately every 18 months according to Moore’s law.  This 
yields a factor of 10 improvements every 5 years and a factor of 100 improvements every 
10.  By some accounts, storage capacity is increasing at a somewhat faster rate, doubling 
about every 12 months, and network capacity is growing even faster, doubling 
approximately every 9 months. 
Because of these performance trends, spies can steal megabytes of information in 
just a few seconds, and computer viruses and worms can spread at record-breaking 
speeds.  During the peak of its infection frenzy, the Code Red worm infected more than 
2,000 computers per minute.18  But this was just a prelude of what is coming.  At the 
University of California, Berkeley, a researcher showed how a “Warhol Worm” could 
infect all vulnerable servers on the Internet in 15 minutes to an hour.  Researchers at 
Silicon Defense took the concept further, showing how a “Flash Worm” could do it in 
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thirty seconds.19
At the same time, high bandwidth data pipes and increased network traffic can 
make it more difficult to monitor networks for intrusions and other forms of abuse and to 
intercept particular traffic in support of a criminal investigation or foreign intelligence 
operation.  Higher capacity disks make it more time consuming to scan disks for 
malicious code and conduct computer forensics examinations.  
The relative lag of processor improvements to those of storage and networks 
could aggravate the challenges, although multiprocessor supercomputers and distributed 
computing can be used to compensate.  A distributed approach is already used by many 
network-based intrusion detection systems and to break encryption keys in criminal 
investigations.  Breakthrough processor technologies such as quantum and DNA 
computing might also counter the lag, but these technologies represent long-term 
solutions and can also benefit the adversary.  
Attack tools have become more powerful as developers build on each other’s 
work and program their own knowledge into the tools.20  The Nimda worm combined 
features from several previous viruses and worms in order to create a powerful worm that 
spread by four channels: e-mail, Web downloads, file sharing, and active scanning for 
and infection of vulnerable Web servers.  The advanced distributed denial of service tools 
have sophisticated command and control capabilities that allow an attacker to direct the 
actions of potentially thousands of previously compromised “zombie” computers.  The 
zombies carry out the actual attack, using various techniques to thwart tracing. 
Many attack tools are simple to use.  “Script kiddies” and others with malicious 
intent but little skill can download the tools and launch destructive attacks without even 
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understanding how the tools work.  E-mail worms can be constructed with windows-
based software such as the VBS Worm Generator.  All the attacker needs to do is type in 
a subject line and message body for the e-mail message carrying the worm and check a 
few boxes. 
Improvements in hardware and software have also benefited security.  Advances 
in artificial intelligence, data mining, and distributed processing have furthered the 
development of intrusion and misuse detection, for example. 
 
VULNERABILITIES 
One might think that over time, security would get better and systems would be less 
vulnerable to attack.  While this is true for some software, overall, the state of security 
has gotten worse as witnessed by the increases in attacks and also vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerabilities arise in two places: first, in the products themselves, and second, 
in the way they are installed and used.  With respect to the first, the number of product 
vulnerabilities reported to CERT/CC has more than doubled annually in the past few 
years (see Figure 2).  In 1998, CERT/CC received reports of 262 vulnerabilities or less 
than 1 a day.  By 2001, this was up to 2,437 or almost 7 a day.  These security holes can 
be attributed to several factors, including growth in the size and number of software 
products, inadequate attention to security and reliability during the software development 
process, and unanticipated side effects and interactions among different products. 
With respect to the second source of vulnerabilities, products are frequently 
installed or used in ways that are not secure.  Users pick weak passwords and system 
administrators fail to install security patches (code fixes) or alter default settings that 
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leave their systems open to attack.  In September 2001, the System Administration, 
Networking, and Security (SANS) Institute and FBI issued a report identifying the top 20 
Internet vulnerabilities.21  At the top of the list was default installs of operating system 
and applications.  Functions were enabled that were not needed and had security flaws.  
Second on the list were accounts with no passwords or weak ones. 
This trend in vulnerabilities has been shaping the security infrastructure.  It has 
created a market for reports about vulnerabilities and how to correct them.  In addition, it 
is leading software developers to find ways of developing more robust software.  In 
January 2002, for example, Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates sent a memo to all employees 
saying that security would be a top priority for the company.  As part of the new 
Trustworthy Computing Initiative, Microsoft began training their software developers in 
security and announced a commitment to ship Windows.NET Server 2003 “secure by 
default.”22   
Building systems that are immune from any attack is a daunting, indeed 
impossible, task.  Whereas the attacker only needs to find one flaw to launch an attack, 
the defender must find and fix every single one of them.  However, considerable 
improvement is possible, as many common flaws are avoidable.  Researchers have shown 
that introducing secure software engineering principles into the early stages of software 
development can yield significant cost savings.23
Vulnerability trends are drawing attention to issues of product liability.  Software 
is frequently distributed under shrink wrap and click wrap licenses that absolve vendors 
of any problems.  This practice is being questioned, however, as users become 
increasingly fed up with faulty software.  If vendors are held liable for security flaws, or 
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at least flaws resulting from sloppy software development practices, this would provide a 
strong incentive to deliver better products. 
The growing vulnerability problem has also stimulated a lively debate over “open 
source” software, that is, software such as Linux whose source code is open for public 
scrutiny, vs. closed systems like Windows whose source code is proprietary and kept 
secret.  On the one hand, open systems have the potential of being more secure than 
closed ones, because it is easier to find and fix flaws when anyone can examine the 
source code and anyone can post a fix.  With closed systems, users are dependent on 
vendors to fix, if not find, the flaws.  On the other hand, hackers also have an advantage 
when they can get access to source code, and they may decide to exploit the problems 
they find rather than report them.  Moreover, making the code available to public scrutiny 
does not mean anyone will in fact study it closely.  On balance, whether a system is open 
or closed might not matter much in terms of security.24  Security might be affected more 
by the priority and practices of the vendor. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The economic factors shaping the security infrastructure can be analyzed in terms of 
three groups of people: buyers, sellers, and donors.  Buyers pursue security primarily to 
avoid economic losses.  Sellers, on the other hand, see security as a business opportunity 
and way of making money.  Finally, donors, who are predominantly government 




Organizations invest in security to avoid or at least contain the damages that result from 
an attack.  These damages can include the cost of investigating and responding to an 
attack (e.g., clearing out viruses and restoring data), lost revenue and employee 
productivity from system down time, lost business due to lost credibility and customer 
confidence, and litigation costs.  Company stocks can also drop following press reports of 
certain types of incidents.  A study of the economic effect of information security 
incidents conducted at the University of Maryland found a significant negative stock 
market reaction to security breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential data.  
Interestingly, there was no significant market reaction for other types of incidents (e.g., 
web site defacements and denial-of-service attacks).25  Finally, some companies have 
been put out of business by attacks.  In February 2002, CloudNine Communications, one 
of Britain’s oldest Internet Service Providers, shut its doors following a distributed 
denial-of-service attack.  They concluded that repairing their network would have 
required too much downtime to remain in business.26
A few studies have attempted to quantify losses on a global or organizational 
basis.  InformationWeek and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP estimated that computer-
based attacks took a $1.6 trillion toll on the worldwide economy in the year 2000 based 
on their global survey.  The cost to the United States alone was an estimated $266 billion, 
or more than 2.5% of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product.  Computer Economics of 
Carlsbad, California, estimated that the ILOVEYOU virus and variants, which crippled 
computers in May 2000, cost $8.5 billion in damage worldwide, vastly exceeding the 
damages from any previous or subsequent virus.27  The Computer Security Institute and 
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FBI reported that their 2002 survey received reports of incidents costing a total of $456 
million.28 These losses represented 223 companies (out of 503 responding to the survey), 
for an average loss of over $2 million.  Whether any of these numbers is accurate or not 
matters less for security than that they are being used to justify the expenditure of more 
resources to solve security problems.  
Ideally, security would be free, fast, and foolproof.  In practice, it is never all 
three, and companies need to make hard choices about how much to spend and what to 
spend it on.  In determining security expenditures, a reasonable goal is a positive return 
on investment (ROI): spend X dollars on security and save at least X in losses from 
attacks.  The difficulty, however, is that it can be hard to compute ROI for a given 
approach.  Consequently, security purchases and practices are often based on other 
factors such as industry best practices, fear of attack, product ratings, salesmanship, 
advise from consultants, budget restrictions, and so forth.   
Quantitative measures, however, have proven effective for evaluating certain 
security options.  Virtual private networks (VPNs) that run over the Internet, for example, 
have been shown to provide a cheaper means of protecting communications than separate 
leased lines.  And research conducted by @stake Labs has shown that by following 
certain steps to harden network servers from attack, thruput on their sample networks 
improved by 1.93% to 3.28% on average.29 As a third example, RTI International 
assessed the benefits of role-based access controls (RBAC) relative to alternative access 
control systems (e.g., lists of specific users authorized to access particular files).  From 
their study, they projected a net present value of RBAC through 2006 of approximately 
$671 million.30  The figure takes into account end-user’s operational benefits as well as 
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their implementation costs and research and development costs. 
Economic incentives to invest in security will be influenced by liability and 
insurance factors.  If organizations are held liable for attacks against third party systems 
that exploit easily avoidable weaknesses in their own, they will be driven to purchase 
better products and services from vendors and to follow better security practices 
internally.  Similar effects are likely if insurance premiums are tied to the security posture 
of an organization.  Standards and best practices will play an important role in 
establishing security baselines for negligence and insurance premiums. 
 
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY 
The growing rate of cyber attacks led many entrepreneurs to view the attacks not just as a 
threat, but also as a business opportunity.  In 2000, the worldwide Internet security 
market reached $5.1 billion in revenue, according to market researcher IDC.  This was a 
33% increase over 1999.  IDC projected that revenues would surpass $14 billion in 
2005.31
Industry is often accused of hyping the threat or overstating the benefits of their 
products in order to stimulate demand and increase business.  However, the threat is real 
and serious.  Moreover, it is aggravated by hackers, who attack systems and publish 
vulnerability information and hacking tools, in some cases as a way of getting jobs in the 
security industry and selling themselves as security consultants. 
Until recently, security was not a priority for most organizations.  Product 
selections were based more on factors such as cost, functionality, performance, and ease-
of-use than on security.  Consequently, vendors could not make a business care for 
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building secure products in an environment where cost and time-to-market were critical.  
This is changing, as security has become a higher priority. 
The adoption of standards by government and industry groups affects the market 
by helping some products and vendors, while hurting others.  For example, by selecting 
the Rijndahl encryption algorithm for its Advanced Encryption Standard, the U.S. 
government pushed the market to favor Rijndahl over certain competing methods.  De 
facto standards also matter, as when the industry began using SSL to encrypt web traffic. 
Patents also affect the market.  They stimulate innovation by offering inventors a 
means of protecting their work; this is the usual rationale for patents.  They do more than 
that, however—patents also push companies to invent new technologies so as to avoid 
paying license fees for products protected by existing patents.  In this regard, they 
stimulate innovation, but at a cost of decreased standardization and interoperability. 
  Another factor affecting the market is government regulation, including trade 
restrictions.  Until a few years ago, export controls on encryption technologies placed 
U.S. companies at a disadvantage in international markets and generally held back the 
spread of encryption.  Those controls were substantially liberalized in 1999, however, so 
this is no longer a significant factor. 
Government regulation can take the form of product requirements.  In March 
2002, Senator Fritz Hollings introduced a bill that would prohibit the sale and distribution 
of “digital media devices” that did not feature copyright-protection standards to be set by 
the federal government.  The Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act 
received considerable support from Hollywood, which seeks technology to protect their 
intellectual property from distribution on the Internet in violation of copyrights.  The IT 
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industry, however, generally opposes any government regulation, as it denies them 
certain business opportunities. 
Governments have influenced the security market by issuing criteria for assessing 
the security offered by a product.  The U.S. Department of Defense Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria (the “Orange Book”) and more recent international Common 
Criteria, for example, have led to products that meet specified security objective and an 
industry segment concerned with product evaluations.  The cost of building to standards 




Grants issued by the National Science Foundation, Department of Defense, and other 
public and private sector organizations have encouraged security research and the 
development of security courses and programs in academia.  These efforts have led to 
innovations in security and to a growing cadre of security specialists.   
One grant program specifically aimed at increasing the cyber defense capability 
of the nation is the Federal Cyber Service Scholarship for Service program. The program 
offers scholarship and capacity building grants to universities in the area of security.  The 
objective is to increase the number of qualified students entering the fields of information 
assurance and computer security and to increase the capacity of colleges and universities 
within the United States to produce professionals in these fields.  Students receiving 
scholarships are required to work for a federal agency for two years as their federal cyber 
service commitment.  The program, which is administered by the National Science 
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Foundation, ties in with another educational initiative operated by the National Security 
Agency.  Their program promotes higher education in information assurance and security 
by designating qualified institutions as Centers of Academic Excellence in Information 
Assurance.32  Other programs are focused on research and development in security. 
Internal funding within government agencies has also significantly impacted the 
security infrastructure.  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), for 
example, has contributed numerous standards and guidelines for security, particularly in 
the area of cryptography, but in other areas as well.33  The value of NIST to security 
developments was measured in the RTI study of role-based access control mentioned 




The security infrastructure is driven in part by psychological factors.  These are divided 
into two categories: intellectual and emotional.  Both relate to why people get involved in 
security as attackers, defenders, and participants in policy debates. 
 
INTELLECTUAL FACTORS 
I was drawn to security primarily by intellectual interests.  I wanted to find ways of 
making systems secure, not because I had sensitive information that needed to be 
protected, but because I found the problem to be intellectually challenging.  I recognized 
that security was important for protecting against cyber threats, but I was not out to save 
the world from hackers and information thieves. 
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I expect that many people in the field were similarly motivated.  I recall in the 
mid 1990s, during the heat of the debates over cryptography policy, a prominent 
government official remarked that it was impossible to control cryptography because of 
its intellectual appeal.  He was right, of course.   
The intellectual attraction of security comes not only from designing security 
mechanisms, but also from breaking them or just attempting to break them.  This is 
fortunate, because it is not possible to build secure systems without understanding how 
they might be attacked.  Security is an iterative process between finding and fixing 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an adversary.  The downside is that the 
intellectual appeal of cracking systems also motivates the hackers.  A survey of 164 
hackers conducted by Nicholas Chantler of Queensland University of Technology in 




People pursue security for emotional as well as intellectual reasons.  They might enter the 
field because they see cyber threats as a serious threat to society or are paranoid of being 
a victim themselves.  They might find that working in security gives them a feeling of 
satisfaction or self-esteem.  They might recommend security purchases, funding, or 
legislation out of fear, uncertainty, or doubt (FUD) over the seriousness of the security 
threat.  FUD is often cited when it appears that it is being used to promote an agenda that 
does not stand on its own merits. 
 Hackers also pursue their activities for emotional reasons.  Chantler’s study found 
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that the number three reason for hacking was the pursuit of pleasure.  After that came an 
assortment of emotional, social, and financial reasons, including recognition, excitement 
(of doing something illegal), friendship, self-gratification, addiction, espionage, theft, 
profit, vengeance, sabotage, and freedom. 36  
If hacking had no intellectual or emotional appeal, it is unlikely we would have 
the serious problem we have today.   Hackers may not be responsible for some of the 
most serious attacks, but they have contributed substantially to the base of knowledge and 
tools needed to carry out an attack.  Of course, hackers alone cannot be blamed for this, 
because security professionals also publish information about security vulnerabilities on 
the grounds that doing so will lead to better security. 
 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS 
The security infrastructure is shaped by social and political factors.  This section 
describes four areas of influence: national security and public safety, privacy, information 
sharing, and international cooperation. 
 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY 
Governments are responsible for the national security and public safety of their countries.  
To address the cyber threats, they have adopted laws that criminalize cyber crimes and 
regulations mandating security in certain sectors, established organizations and programs 
that help with cyberspace defense, and allocated money for cyber defense research, 
education, and other programs. 
In the United States, improving the security of critical infrastructures and 
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cyberspace more generally received greater attention within the Administration and 
Congress following the formation of the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in 1996.  Their recommendations led to Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 63, which created the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) 
within the Department of Commerce and the National Infrastructure Protection Center 
(NIPC), housed at the FBI but with representatives from several agencies.  The CIAO 
was established to coordinate national planning efforts related to critical infrastructure 
protection.   
The NIPC serves as a national critical infrastructure threat assessment, warning, 
vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation and response entity.  Its focus is as 
much on prevention as on investigation and response.  Towards that end, it issues security 
assessments, advisories, and alerts, the latter addressing major threats and imminent or 
in-progress attacks targeting national networks or critical infrastructures.  The NIPC also 
established InfraGard chapters at all 56 FBI field offices.  The chapters provide formal 
and informal channels for the exchange of information about infrastructure threats and 
vulnerabilities among people in law enforcement and the private sector.  As of July 1, 
2002, membership had reached 4,609. 
PDD 63 also encouraged the private sector to create Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISACs) in cooperation with the government.  The centers serve as a 
mechanism for gathering, analyzing, appropriately sanitizing, and disseminating private 
sector information related to infrastructure vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents.  So far, 
ISACs have been established for numerous sectors, including banking and finance, 
telecommunications (operated by the National Coordinating Center), electric power 
 28
(operated by the North American Electric Reliability Council), oil and gas, and 
information technology.  In addition to the ISACs and InfraGard chapters, numerous 
other groups facilitate information sharing, including the CERT/CC and other computer 
emergency response teams, the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Protection, the High 
Tech Crime Investigators Association, the United States Secret Service Electronic Crimes 
Task Forces, the Joint Council on Information Age Crime, and the Center for Internet 
Security.  All of these efforts can help strengthen the cyber defense and crime fighting 
capabilities of their members. 
One of the challenges facing all of these groups is that industry has been reluctant 
to share information out of concern for its confidentiality.  In particular, companies are 
concerned that sensitive information provided voluntarily might not be adequately 
protected, or that it could be subject to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests or 
lawsuits.  Industry is also concerned that cooperation with industry partners might violate 
antitrust laws.  Bills have been introduced in the House and Senate to provide limited 
exemption from FOIA. 
On October 16, 2001, President Bush issued an Executive Order on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.  The order established the President’s 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board (PCIPB), and charged it to recommend policies 
and coordinate programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructures.  It 
assigned several areas of activity to the Board, including outreach to the private sector 
and to state and local governments; information sharing; incident coordination and 
response; recruitment, retention, and training of Executive Branch security professionals; 
research and development; law enforcement coordination with national security 
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components; international information infrastructure protection; legislation; and 
coordination with the newly formed Office of Homeland Security.  
The Department of Justice has launched several initiatives aimed at strengthening 
the cyber-crime-fighting capability of the criminal justice community.  The Electronic 
Crimes Partnership Initiative is tackling a broad range of issues, including technology, 
technical assistance, legal and policy issues, education and training, outreach and 
awareness, and standards and certification.  The partnership includes representatives from 
law enforcement, industry, and academia. 
Within the Department of Defense, the Commander in Chief of Space Command 
has primary responsibility for computer network operations.  Space Command’s Joint 
Task Force Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) serves as the operational 
component for all CNO, which includes both computer network defense and computer 
network attack.  In conjunction with the unified commands, services and DOD agencies, 
the JTF-CNO coordinates and directs the defense of DOD computer systems and 
networks. 
The events of September 11 and war on terrorism are leading to new initiatives, 
funding, and legislation aimed at combating all forms of terrorism, including cyber 
terrorism.  These include establishment of a Department of Homeland Defense, which 
will bring together programs currently housed in other agencies. 
 
PRIVACY 
Privacy issues have shaped the security infrastructure in two ways.  First, they have led to 
laws and regulations such as HIPAA that mandate security for the purpose of privacy 
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protection, and to the development and use of security technologies that protect 
information and therefore privacy.  The popular encryption package Pretty Good Privacy 
(PGP) was developed primary to protect the private files and e-mail correspondence of 
citizens from government eavesdroppers and other spies.  Its author, Phil Zimmermann, 
was especially concerned with helping human rights activists in countries with repressive 
governments.  There are numerous other examples of technology that offer encryption 
and anonymity services to enhance privacy. 
Second, privacy issues have led to policies, regulations, and technology that 
constrain government investigations of cyber crime and cyber terrorism.  Although they 
have provided strong privacy protections, those protections are being challenged by 
changes in laws and policies aimed at facilitating the fight against terrorism. The U.S. 
Patriot Act, for example, raised numerous concerns.37
  In the United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) bill has 
provisions that facilitate government monitoring of Internet traffic and access to 
encryption keys.38 Opposition to the bill led one mathematician to develop a new 
operating system, called M-o-o-t, that would foil government surveillance by storing all 
data and keys on servers outside the U.K. government’s jurisdiction.39
 
INFORMATION SHARING 
Information sharing, both publicly and within closed groups, has helped advance the 
science and practice of security, and increase knowledge and awareness about security.  
While these effects are all positive, open publication has raised concerns about 
information getting into the hands of the “bad guys.”  Today, these concerns generally 
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involve the publication of information about security vulnerabilities and of software tools 
that exploit those vulnerabilities.  At one time they also included the publication of 
information relating to particular security technologies, most notably cryptography, but 
these concerns generally gave way to those recognizing the value of publishing such 
information so as to promote security. 
The open publication of vulnerability information raises two issues: first, how 
much information should be made public, and second, when should publication take 
place.  At one extreme, under a policy of full and immediate disclosure, all information 
about vulnerability, including any attack software that can be used to exploit it, is posted 
following its discovery.  The rationale is that it forces vendors to fix problems while also 
keeping users informed.  This is supported by numerous cases in which vendors did not 
fix problems until the vulnerability information was published.  
At the other extreme, no information about vulnerability is posted, at least until 
the vendor has released a patch that fixes the problem; even then, only minimal 
information is disclosed.  The argument in this case is that posting vulnerability 
information, particularly hacking tools, leads to attacks.  Indeed, data reported to 
CERT/CC showed considerably heightened attack activity following the release of 
exploit tools associated with certain vulnerabilities.40  The increased activity lasted many 
months beyond the release of the patches, as system administrators were slow to install 
the fixes.  Publication of exploit software had a much greater impact than publication of 
vulnerability information alone, because it enabled script kiddies with little skill to launch 
attacks. 
In between the extremes are policies that favor disclosing information about 
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vulnerabilities, but generally not the attack tools, and giving vendors a grace period in 
which to release a patch before publication.  The CERT/CC follows a policy giving 
vendors 45 days to fix their problem. 41  However, many security practitioners favor a 
shorter grace period.  An April 2002 industry survey conducted by the Hurwitz group 
found that 39% of the more than 300 respondents favored disclosure immediately, with 
another 28% favoring disclosure within a week.  However, only 13% favored posting 
“proof of concept” exploit software.    
Although supporters of full disclosure make their argument on security grounds, 
they may be motivated as much by self-promotion as a desire to make systems more 
secure.  Being first to publish can increase one’s stature in the scientific, security, and 
hacking communities and lead to new business opportunities. 
In general, it is lawful to publish exploit software, even though use of such 
software to conduct an actual attack is a crime.  There are, however, exceptions.  The 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act restricts the production, distribution, and use of 
software that circumvents copyright protection on the grounds that such software harms 
copyright owners. 
  The DMCA and its application has been challenged on First Amendment grounds.  
In one highly publicized lawsuit, eight movie companies sued 2600 magazine for posting 
and linking to the DVD-descrambling program DeCSS.42  After a federal district court 
ordered 2600 to remove the software and links from their website, the Electronic Frontier 
Association asked a federal appeals court to overturn the ruling.  The EFF, which 
represents 2600, claimed that the ruling was an “unconstitutional constraint on free 
speech,” because it blocked legitimate uses of DeCSS such as for educational purposes.  
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The court rejected EFF’s appeal.  However, Professor David Touretzky of Carnegie 
Mellon University has over two dozen different versions of the DeCSS on his website, 




Cyber attacks frequently cross national borders as attackers hack one system after 
another, using each to launch an attack against the next.  Such behavior severely 
complicates investigations, as it requires cooperation from every country involved.  
Further, prosecution may not be possible if the attack is not a criminal offense in the 
perpetrator’s own country.   
  Governments have come together in several forums, including the G8, Council of 
Europe (CoE), and European Union to address the problems associated with international 
attacks and facilitate international cooperation.  The CoE’s effort led to the adoption of 
Convention on Cyber-Crime in 2001.  The Convention aims to harmonize domestic 
statutes relating to cyber crime and procedures relating to extradition, mutual assistance, 
and evidence collection and preservation.44  However, because the signatories to the 
convention are limited to the Council of Europe members and official observers (the 
United States, Canada, Japan, and South Africa), a broader-based international treaty is 
needed to address cyber crime on a global scale.  A group at Stanford University 





This chapter has approached the topic of cyber security and critical infrastructure 
protection from a right angle.  Instead of focusing on infrastructure defense, the chapter 
has viewed cyber security as an infrastructure in its own right, and focused on the factors 
shaping its development.   
This security infrastructure consists of technologies, procedures and practices, 
laws and regulations, and people and organizations.  It is not owned by any party, and is 
dispersed globally throughout the public and private sector.  It is regulated only to the 
extent that regulations apply to elements of the infrastructure, for example, the adoption 
of cyber crime laws and the formation of corporations and associations that specialize in 
security.  It is a relatively new infrastructure, tied closely with the emergence of 
information technology as a fundamental component of business practices, control 
systems, and other processes. 
The factors shaping the infrastructure include threats, technology trends, 
economic factors, psychological factors, and social and political factors.  Examining 
these factors shows why security is a major problem today.  Security threats, amplified by 
technology trends, have outpaced the economic and social case for developing and 
operating secure systems.  However, that case has been building, stimulating rapid 
growth of the security infrastructure and lending hope that enough progress can be made 
to avoid a major catastrophe from a cyber attack against critical infrastructures.  Just as 
the international community responded to the Y2K bug, which also threatened critical 
infrastructures, it may effectively respond to the security problems that still plague 
information systems.  That security is now a high priority in both the public and private 
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